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The New York Department of Financial Service’s New 
Anti-Money Laundering Regulation: A Model for 
Improvement 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Organizations such as ISIS, al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Boko 
Haram rely on vast amounts of money moving around the world to fuel 
their terror efforts.1 These funds are utilized for a number of purposes 
such as salaries and benefits, recruitment, bribes, explosives, guns, and 
tactical gear.2 Without substantial funding, a  terrorist  organization 
either will not be able to execute attacks, or the impact of their attacks 
will be reduced.3 For example, it is estimated that the September 11, 
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, paid for by al Qaeda, cost 
between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and execute.4 A significant 
portion of that money went toward paying the nineteen operatives 
responsible for the execution of the attack.5 Khalid Sheik Mohammed, 
the “principal architect of the 9/11 attacks,” used wire transfers and cash 
to provide the funds.6 These funds were either carried into the United 
States7 or deposited overseas and then accessed from within the United 
 
 
1. Michael   Freeman,   Introduction   to   Financing   Terrorism:   Case   Studies,   in 
FINANCING TERRORISM: CASE STUDIES 3, 3 (Michael Freeman ed., 2012). 
2. Id. 
3. See id. (describing the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and noting that the 
organizer, Ramzi Yousef had stated that if he had been able to obtain more funds, the bomb 
used would have contained more explosives and created destruction on a much larger scale). 
4. THOMAS H. KEAN & LEE H. HAMILTON, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 
169 (2004). 
5.    Id. at 172. 
6.    Id. at 145. 
7. Multiple operatives received cash before traveling to the United States. Michael 
Freeman & Moyara Ruehsen, Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview, 7 PERSPECTIVES 
ON TERRORISM, no. 4, Aug. 2013, at 5, 8, http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/ 
35989/Freeman_Terrorism_Financing_2013.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. The 
operatives brought this cash into the United States, often declaring it at customs. Id. The 
most money brought in by one operative was $35,000 by Zacarious Moussaoiu. Id. He 
declared this money at customs. Id. 
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States.8     Mohammed’s  nephew,  Ali  Abdul  Aziz  Ali,  also  wired 
$114,500 to the United States that was used by an associated cell in 
Hamburg to pay for flight training.9 This amount was transferred over 
the course of only five transfers that ranged from $5,000 to $70,000,  
and went undetected by authorities.10 
A significant amount of money utilized by  terrorist 
organizations flows through financial institutions globally.11 Terrorist 
organizations raise money through multiple avenues, including criminal 
activity12 and private donations from interested individuals or groups.13 
These organizations exploit a number of different methods to move  
their capital through the financial system; these methods are constantly 
evolving, leading to difficulties in cracking down on the activities.14   
The most common methods include, but are not limited to: setting up 
offshore shell companies, front organizations, or trusts to receive 
money; transferring money from the bank accounts of charitable and 
non-profit organizations under the guise of a “gift;” and purchasing real 
estate  and  art  to  conceal  the  origination  of  money.15     Terrorist 
 
8. KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 172. 
9. KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 224. According to the 9/11 Commission 
report, Ali was not required to provide identification when making these transfers, nor were 
the aliases that he chose questioned about their authenticity or validity. KEAN & HAMILTON, 
supra note 4, at 224. 
10. KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 224. 
11. See generally Maria A. de Dios, The Sixth Pillar of Anti-Money Laundering 
Compliance: Balancing Effective Enforcement With Financial Privacy, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 495 (2016) (describing the current status of AML laws and the need for a 
global system to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism). 
12. See generally FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, EMERGING TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS 
13–23 (2015) [hereinafter FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS], http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ 
media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf (highlighting the 
traditional and known methods used by terrorist organizations to generate revenue for their 
operations). Terrorist organizations engage in significant criminal activity, the proceeds of 
which help to fund their terror efforts. Id. They engage in identity theft to directly steal 
funds, fraud, illegal smuggling of goods, bank robberies, drug trafficking, extortion, 
kidnapping. Id. 
13. Id. at 13. 
14.    Id. at 20–23. 
15. PETER REUTER, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING 
27–33 (2004); FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 13–20 (“[T]errorist 
organi[z]ations rely on numerous sources of income and . . . they use a range of methods to 
move funds, often internationally, to their end point without being detected.”). The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has included in their DSC Risk Management 
Manual of Examination Policies a fairly exhaustive list of “money laundering red flags.”  
FIN. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DSC RISK MGMT. MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 8.1, at 39– 
44   (2005)   [hereinafter   BSA  MANUAL], https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/ 
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organizations are also increasingly relying on cash in an effort to avoid 
monitoring and detection of  their  operations.16  Often,  transfers 
involving banks are smaller in size in an effort to limit exposure and 
avoid detection, and may later be combined with other deposits for 
financing purposes.17 Money launderers use small-scale transfers to 
structure deposits, which can often evade the reporting thresholds for 
Customer Transaction Reports (“CTR”) and Suspicious  Activity 
Reports (“SAR”), which are required under the Bank Secrecy Act 
(“BSA”).18    CTRs  require  reporting  of  “currency  transactions” over 
$10,000, while SARs require reporting of transactions over $5,000 that 
may involve money laundering or violations of the BSA.19 All financial 
institutions are susceptible to small-scale transfers.20 Because of their 
large size and substantial number of transactions, however, the 
vulnerability of large financial institutions is particularly concerning, as 
 
section8-1.pdf. Such red flags include, inter alia, structured or recurring, non-reportable 
transactions; customer refusal or reluctance to provide information  or  identification; 
multiple third parties conducting separate, but related, non-reportable transactions; 
transactions which are not consistent with the customer’s business, occupation, or income 
level; numerous deposits under $10,000 in a short period of time, accounts with a high 
volume of activity and low balances; and large amounts of cash maintained in a safe deposit 
box. Id.; see Tom Wright & Bradley Hope, Behind the IMDB Scandal: Banks That Missed 
Clues and Bowed to the Pressure, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-the- 
1mdb-scandal-banks-that-missed-clues-and-bowed-to-pressure-1473109548 (updated Sept. 
6, 2016, 1:31 AM) (“That the alleged fraud could roll on for so long without detection 
suggests weaknesses in a global system designed to clamp down on money laundering, a 
problem U.S. and other western leaders have pledged to fix.”). 
16. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH THE PHYSICAL 
TRANSPORTATION OF CASH 3 (2015) [hereinafter FATF, MONEY LAUNDERING], http:// 
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/money-laundering-through-transportation- 
cash.pdf. 
17. See FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 21 (noting that money 
laundering sometimes involves structured deposits of cash into bank accounts that are later 
transferred elsewhere). 
18. Infra Part III; see also BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 40–44 (highlighting 
the various methods used by money launderers to prevent detection, including the  
structuring of deposits, which is the most common suspicious activity reported to FinCEN). 
19.    31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2016) (CTRs), 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(1)–(4) (SARs); see also 
infra Part III (describing CTRs, SARs, and their reporting requirements). 
20. See FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 21 (“[T]errorism 
financing through the banking sector is often small-scale and be difficult to distinguish from 
the large number of legitimate financial transactions undertaken each day.”); Banking 
Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements (“NYDFS 
Regulation”) § 504.1 (effective Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/ 
adoptions/dfsp504t.pdf; see also KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 224 (describing how 
Ali Abdul Aziz Ali transferred $114,500 undetected into the United States through smaller 
transfers that “were essentially invisible amid the billions of dollars flowing daily across the 
globe”). 
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they are less likely to detect these transactions taking place.21 
The BSA,22 originally passed in 1970, requires banks to provide 
certain records that are otherwise not obtainable in order to assist the 
federal government in combating money laundering.23 Banks do this by 
filing reports on currency transactions and customer relationships in the 
form of CTRs and SARs.24 However, the BSA’s regulations must be 
expanded at both the state and federal level to ensure sufficient 
regulation to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism.25 
New York has recently adopted a regulation, to be enforced by 
the New York Department of Financial Services, to enhance these 
efforts.26 It increases regulation in an area that is vulnerable and subject 
to significant corruption, and its implementation could have a dramatic 
impact on the financing of terrorism.27 The regulation provides a higher 
level of structure to the existing federal BSA and anti-money laundering 
 
 
 
21. See FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 21 (“The sheer size and 
scope of the international financial sector gives terrorist groups and financiers the 
opportunity to blend in with normal financial activity to avoid attracting attention.”). 
22. The BSA’s full title is the Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and 
Foreign Transactions Act of 1970. 
23. The Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq (2015). 
24. See BSA MANUAL supra note 15, § 8.1, at 1–5, 45–48 (describing the process of 
filing a CTR or SAR and the effectiveness of these reports); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) 
(2015) (allowing for the Secretary of the Treasury to require reporting of suspicious 
transactions). 
25. See NYDFS Regulation § 504.1 (noting that shortcomings have been found in the 
compliance with BSA/AML laws and regulations that necessitated the  clarifying 
regulation). 
26. Id. The New York Department of Financial Services has even more recently 
proposed legislation to protect financial institutions from cyber attacks, which can also 
provide a source of funding for terrorism. See Greg Farrell, New York Financial Regulator 
Rolls Out Cybersecurity Proposals, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2016, 11:55 AM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-13/new-york-financial-regulator-rolls-out- 
cybersecurity-proposals (describing the recently proposed legislation that would protect 
financial institutions from cyber attacks). The proposed legislation would require banks and 
insurance companies to create cybersecurity programs and designate an “internal 
cybersecurity officer.” Id. 
27. See NYDFS Regulation § 504 (“[T]he Department has reason to believe that 
financial institutions have shortcomings in their transaction monitoring an filtering 
programs.”); see also CONNIE M. FRIESEN & JOEL D. FEINBERG, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, 
UPDATE: NEW YORK BANKING REGULATOR ISSUES ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING RULES FOR 
TRANSACTION MONITORING AND FILTERING PROGRAMS 4 (July 7, 2016), http:// 
www.sidley.com/~/media/update-pdfs/2016/07/20160707-banking-and-financial-services- 
update-1.pdf (stating that the Department of Financial services “can be expected to take an 
aggressive approach in the enforcement of the Final Rule”). 
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(“AML”) laws that guide New York state regulated institutions.28 
“Regulated institutions” include (1) “all banks, trust companies, private 
bankers, savings banks, and savings and loan associations chartered” in 
New York; (2) “all branches and agencies of foreign banking 
corporations licensed” in New York; and (3) “all check cashers and 
money transmitters licensed” in New York.29 The regulation could 
establish an important precedent of states taking affirmative steps to 
combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.30 However, 
this additional regulation only represents a model for improvement, 
which should be followed by other states.31 The federal government 
should collaborate with states, such as New York, to pass similar 
meaningful and productive legislation to reduce the utilization of 
financial institutions for purposes of money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism.32 
This Note examines in depth the New York Department of 
Financial Service’s recently enacted AML regulation and argues for 
similar regulations nationwide. Part II of this Note highlights current 
federal law and regulations relating to AML and the financing of 
terrorism.33 Part III discusses the New York Department of Financial 
Services regulation in its proposed and final form.34  Part IV analyzes  
the regulation and highlights the critiques of the proposed regulation, 
challenges that regulated institutions will face in implementing the 
regulation, and unintended consequences of the regulation.35 
 
 
 
28. See FRIESEN & FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 4 (advising that regulated institutions 
“should review and, where necessary, enhance its existing programs to ensure that they are 
reasonably designed and risk-based to meet the NYDFS’ requirements”). 
29. NYDFS Regulation § 504.2; see infra Part II. 
30. See Press Release, New York Department of Financial Services, DFS Issues Final 
Anti-Terrorism Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Regulation (June 30, 2016) 
[hereinafter NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement], http://www.dfs.ny.gov/ 
about/press/pr1606301.htm (discussing compliance gaps in the financial regulatory 
framework that the regulation seeks to close). 
31. See id. (“‘It is time to close the compliance gaps in our financial regulatory 
framework to shut down money laundering operations and eliminate potential channels that 
can be exploited by global terrorist networks and other criminal enterprises.’”). 
32. See NYDFS Regulation § 504.1 (indicating that there are shortcomings in financial 
institutions’ compliance with BSA/AML regulations and laws, prompting the need for this 
regulation). 
33. See infra Part II. 
34. See infra Part III. 
35. See infra Part IV. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
 
Although originally conceived as an AML law, the BSA has 
evolved to also encapsulate terrorism financing.36 The BSA requires 
financial institutions to maintain records in relation to particular 
transactions, as well as customer information, and regulates the 
disclosure of those records for assistance in law enforcement efforts.37 
The purpose of the BSA is to ensure financial institutions maintain 
appropriate types of records “where such records have a high degree of 
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings” 
or “in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence activities, 
including analysis, to protect against  international  terrorism.”38  The 
USA Patriot Act amended and expanded the BSA after the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center to include the 
language on intelligence, counterintelligence, and international 
terrorism.39 
Two reports through which covered institutions fulfill these 
requirements include CTRs and SARs.40  These reports are filed with  
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), the agency 
tasked with supervising and enforcing the provisions of the BSA.41 A 
CTR is used to report any “currency transaction” over $10,000, for 
which the bank must obtain identification information of the person 
attempting to conduct the transaction.42 “Currency transaction” is  
defined as “any transaction involving the physical transfer of currency 
from   one   person   to   another   and   covers   deposits,   withdrawals, 
 
 
36. See Bank Secrecy Act § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)(A) (2015) (“[S]uch records 
may have in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence activities, including analysis, 
to protect against domestic and international terrorism . . . .”). 
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(2); see also BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 1 (“The 
purpose of the BSA is to require United States (U.S.) financial institutions to maintain 
appropriate records and file certain reports involving currency transactions and a financial 
institution’s customer relationships.”). 
38.    12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(2). 
39. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA PATRIOT Act”), 50 U.S.C. § 1816(a) (2015). 
40. BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 1. 
41. BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 2. FinCEN, originally created in 1990, was 
made a separate bureau within the Department of the Treasury in the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, https:// 
www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/fincen.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2017). 
42.   31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2016). 
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exchanges, or transfers of currency or other  payments.”43  A SAR is 
used to report a transaction under various circumstances, including: (1) 
insider abuse involving any amount; (2) violations aggregating $5,000 
or more where a suspect can be identified; (3) violations aggregating 
$25,000 or more regardless of potential suspects; and (4) transactions 
aggregating $5,000 or more that involve potential money laundering or 
violate the BSA.44 A transaction can involve, but is not limited to, a 
deposit; withdrawal; transfer between accounts; exchange of currency; 
extension of credit; sale of a stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other 
monetary instrument or investment security; or any other payment, 
transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a bank.45 Records that are filed 
under the BSA must be maintained for five years.46  Once a CTR or  
SAR has been filed, a financial institution is not permitted to notify its 
customer.47 FinCEN receives all CTRs and SARs and coordinates 
enforcement among various federal agencies, as they do not have any 
independent enforcement authority.48 
Since the passage of BSA, it has been expanded and 
strengthened  through  multiple  pieces  of  legislation49  including  the 
 
 
43. BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 1. “Currency” is defined as “currency and 
coin of the U.S. or any other country as long as it is customarily accepted as money in the 
country of issue; and a cashier’s check . . ., bank draft, traveler’s check, or money order 
having a face amount of not more than $10,000.”  31 C.F.R. § 1010.330(c)(1). 
44.   12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(1)–(4). 
45.    31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(bbb)(1). 
46.    31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(a)(2). 
47.    31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2). 
48. BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 2. 
49. More recently, in a continued effort to increase protections against money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, the House of Representatives Task Force to 
Investigate Terrorism Financing has recently proposed five pieces of legislation to further 
the effort to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Press Release, U.S. 
Representative Stephen Lynch (D-MA), Terrorist Financing Task Force Introduces 
Counterterrorism Strategy (June 29, 2016), http://lynch.house.gov/press-release/terrorist- 
financing-task-force-introduces-counterterrorism-strategy. These pieces of legislation 
include H.R. 5594, H.R. 5607, H.R. 5603, H.R. 5602, and H.R. 5606.  Id.  These bills  
would, among other goals, increase the power of the Treasury by authorizing the Secretary 
of the Treasury to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Id. Stephen 
Lynch is a ranking member of the House of Representatives Terrorist Financing Task Force, 
a task force created by the Financial Services Committee.  Id.  The Task Force was created 
in 2015 and is charged with investigating how terrorist organizations utilize the global 
financial system to finance their activities and passing legislation to combat those efforts.  
See Press Release, Fin. Servs. Comm., U.S. House of Representatives, Committee to Create 
Bipartisan Task Force to Investigate Terrorist Financing (March 19, 2015), http:// 
financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398815. 
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Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and the Annuzio-Wylie Anti- 
Money Laundering Act of 1992.50 The Money Laundering Control Act 
criminalized money laundering by individuals as well as the facilitation 
of money laundering by financial institutions.51 The Anunzio-Wylie 
Anti-Money Laundering Act required each financial institution to 
establish anti-money laundering programs, which were to include, at a 
minimum: “(1) the development of internal policies, procedures, and 
controls; (2) the designation of a compliance offer; (3) an ongoing 
employee training program; and (3) an independent audit function to  
test programs.”52 
 
III. NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION 504 
 
A. Background of New York Proposed Regulation 
 
In December 2015, Governor Andrew Cuomo announced 
proposed regulations by the New York Department  of  Financial 
Services designed to combat money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism within New York regulated financial institutions.53 The 
purpose of the proposed regulation was to fill gaps in the current 
regulatory scheme promulgated by the current BSA/AML laws and 
regulations and Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) 
requirements.54 Before proposing this regulation, the New York 
Department of Financial Services conducted a series of investigations at 
numerous financial institutions into compliance with current AML laws, 
sanctions violations, and the impact  on terrorist financing.55   Based  on 
 
 
50. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 § 1352(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 
(2015); Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1) 
(2015). 
51.    18 U.S.C. § 1956. 
52.    31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1). 
53. Press Release, New York Department of Financial Services, Governor Cuomo 
Announces Anti-Terrorism Legislation Requiring Senior Financial Executives to Certify 
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Systems (December 1, 2015), http:// 
www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1512011.htm; see also Banking Division Transaction 
Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements and Certifications (“Proposed NYDFS 
Regulation”) § 504 (proposed Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/ 
proposed/rp504t.pdf (the proposed rule that accompanied the announcement of new 
regulations by Governor Cuomo). 
54. Proposed NYDFS Regulation § 504.1. 
55. NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30. 
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this information, the Department of Financial Services determined that 
there were “shortcomings” generated by “a lack of robust governance, 
oversight, and accountability at senior levels.”56 To overcome these 
shortcomings, the regulation seeks to clarify the requirements of a 
transaction monitoring program and a watch list filtering program  
within a regulated institution.57 It was designed to create a system that 
can better monitor and detect transactions involving those individuals 
and organizations on OFAC sanction lists in an effort to ultimately 
prevent them altogether.58 
High profile BSA/AML enforcement actions instituted by the 
New York Department of Financial Services, as well as the federal 
government, likely contributed to the Department’s determination that 
this regulation was necessary.59 For example, in March 2015, 
Commerzbank, a German lender, agreed to pay $1.45 billion to settle 
allegations of money laundering  violations.60  These  allegations 
involved countless transactions that Commerzbank had made through 
financial institutions located in the United States involving sanctioned 
parties, as well as the bank’s engagement in practices that prevented the 
detection of these transactions.61 In its consent order to Commerzbank, 
the Department stated that: 
 
[Commerzbank] maintained ineffective compliance 
procedures relating to due diligence on its foreign 
branches and its customers, failed to share information 
about customers or transactions necessary for BSA/ 
AML compliance with the appropriate New York-based 
compliance personnel, and constructed its monitoring 
process and tools so as to reduce the number of alerts 
that     would     be     generated     and     require  further 
 
 
56. NYDFS Proposed Regulation § 504.1. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. See id. (“The Department of Financial Services . . . has recently been involved in a 
number of investigations into compliance by Regulated institutions . . . .”). 
60. Samuel Rubenfeld and Eyk Henning, Commerzbank Settles U.S. Allegations of 
Sanctions, Money-Laundering Violations, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
commerzbank-to-settle-u-s-allegations-of-sanctions-and-money-laundering-violations- 
1426177346 (updated Mar. 12, 2015, 4:00 PM). 
61. Id. 
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investigation.62 
The deficiencies described in the case of Commerzbank, as well as  
other incidents involving New York-regulated institutions, go to the 
heart of the shortcomings that the regulation is attempting to remedy, 
making it more likely that these enforcement actions served as a 
contributing factor to the adoption of this regulation.63 
 
B. The Final Rule 
 
On June 30, 2016, the New York Department of Financial 
Services issued the final rule (“Final Rule”).64 This rule was passed 
under the authority granted to the Department of Financial Services 
under New York Financial Services Law § 30265 and New York  
Banking Law §§37(3)66 and (4).67 The Final  Rule  mandates 
“[r]egulated [i]nstitutions” to (1) maintain a transaction monitoring 
program, (2) maintain a watch list filtering program, and (3) complete  
an annual certification to ensure  compliance.68  For  purposes  of  the 
Final Rule, “regulated institutions” include “bank regulated institutions” 
and “nonbank regulated institutions.”69 “Bank regulated institutions” 
include “all banks, trust companies, private bankers, savings banks, and 
 
62. Commerzbank AG, 1 (New York Dep’t of Fin. Servs. Mar. 12, 2015) (consent 
order), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/ea150312.pdf. 
63. See id. at 2 (“Commerzbank failed to maintain sufficient controls, policies, and 
procedures to ensure compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and other anti-money 
laundering laws and regulations (‘BSA/AML’) of the United States and New York.”). 
64. Banking Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements 
(“NYDFS Regulation”) § 504 (effective Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/ 
regulations/adoptions/dfsp504t.pdf. The regulation, in its final and codified form,  is  
referred to as the “Final Rule.” FRIESEN & FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 4. 
65. N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 302.a (McKinney 2016) (“The Superintendent shall have 
the power to prescribe . . . rules and regulations and issue orders and guidance involving 
financial products and services . . . .”). 
66. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 37(3) (McKinney 2016) (“[T]he superintendent may require 
any banking organization, licensed lender, licensed casher of checks, licensed mortgage 
banker, foreign banking corporation licensed by the superintendent o do business in this 
state, bank holding company and any non-banking subsidiary thereof, corporate affiliate of a 
corporate banking organization . . . and any non-banking subsidiary of a corporation which 
is an affiliate of a corporate banking organization . . . to make special reports to him at such 
times as he may prescribe.”). 
67. Id. § 37(4) (“The superintendent . . . may prescribe the form and contents of all 
periodical and all special reports.”). 
68. NYDFS Regulation §§ 504.3–504.4. 
69.    Id. § 504.2(e). 
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saving and loan associations chartered pursuant to the New York 
Banking Law” and “all branches and agencies of foreign banking 
corporations licensed . . . to conduct banking operations  in  New 
York.”70 “Nonbank regulated institutions” include “all check cashers  
and money transmitters licensed” in New York.71 The Final Rule does 
not extend regulation to any institution that is not regulated by the New 
York Department of Financial Services, such as federal savings and   
loan banks, federal savings banks, or national banks.72 
The Final Rule took effect on January 1, 2017, with the first 
compliance certification due on April 15, 2018.73 As this date is only 
slightly more than fifteen months after the rule took effect, regulated 
institutions will have to make swift changes to their systems in order to 
ensure compliance.74 For institutions that have been maintaining  
systems that are deficient under this standard, this may result in 
significant cost.75 
The transaction monitoring program, which can be either 
manual or automated, requires regulated institutions to monitor 
transactions that have already been completed to ensure compliance 
with anti-money laundering and BSA regulations.76 This program must 
include eight minimum attributes, to the extent applicable: 
 
(1) be based on the Risk Assessment of the Institution; 
(2) be reviewed and periodically updated at risk-based 
intervals to take into account and reflect changes to 
applicable BSA/AML laws, regulations and regulatory 
 
70.    Id. § 504.2(b). 
71.    Id. § 504.2(d). 
72. Id. § 504; see also CHRISTOPHER L. ALLEN ET AL, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE 
SCHOLER LLP, NEW YORK’S FINAL AML RULE AND STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES (July 12, 
2016, 11:47 AM), http://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2016/07/new- 
final-aml-rule-and-strategic-alternatives (“[T]he final rule does not apply to bank and 
nonbank institutions not already subject to the supervision of the DFS, such as national 
banks, federal savings banks, and federal savings and loan associations chartered by the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or U.S. out-of-state banks with branch officers or 
other facilities located in New York.”). 
73. NYDFS Regulation § 504.6. 
74. SATISH M. KINI ET AL, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, CLIENT UPDATE: NYDFS 
ISSUES FINAL ANTI-MONEY AND SANCTIONS RULE 2 (July 6, 2016), http:// 
www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2016/07/ 
20160706_nydfs_issues_final_anti_money_laundering_and_sanctions_rule.pdf. 
75. Id. 
76. NYDFS Regulation § 504.3(a). 
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warnings, as well as any other information determined 
by the institution to be relevant from the institution’s 
related programs and initiatives; (3) appropriately match 
BSA/AML risks to the institution’s businesses, products, 
services, and customers/counterparties; (4) BSA/AML 
detection scenarios with threshold values and amounts 
designed to detect potential money laundering or other 
suspicious or illegal activities; (5) end-to-end, pre- and 
post-implementation testing of the Transaction 
Monitoring Program, including, as relevant, a review of 
governance, data mapping, transaction coding, detection 
scenario logic, model validation, data input and Program 
output; (6) documentation that articulates the 
institution’s current detection scenarios and the 
underlying assumptions, parameters, and thresholds; (7) 
protocols setting forth how alerts generated by the 
Transaction Monitoring Program will be investigated, 
the process for deciding which alerts will result in a 
filing or other action, the operating areas and individuals 
responsible for making such a decision, and how the 
investigative and decision-making process will be 
documented; and (8) be subject to an on-going analysis 
to assess the continued relevancy of the detection 
scenarios, the underlying rules, threshold values, 
parameters, and assumptions.77 
 
This program allows institutions to determine whether the reporting of a 
particular transaction is necessary within the BSA/AML framework.78 
The second requirement, the watch list filtering program, 
requires regulated institutions to monitor transactions before they are 
completed to ensure compliance with AML and  BSA  regulations.79 
This program requires regulated institutions to “interdict,” or intercept, 
transactions made by individuals and entities that are prohibited from 
making such transactions by financial authorities such as the OFAC.80 
 
77.    Id. § 504.3(a). 
78.    Id. § 504.2 (defining “transaction monitoring program”). 
79.    Id. § 504.3(b). 
80. Id. 
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The OFAC works to enforce economic sanctions against targeted 
foreign countries, individuals, entities, and practices to further U.S. 
foreign policy and national security objectives.81 It maintains and 
publishes sanctions lists of “individuals and companies owned or 
controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries.”82 It also 
maintains and publishes non-country specific lists that detail 
individuals, groups, or entities such as terrorist groups, with whom 
United States citizens or permanent residents are not allowed to engage 
in transactions.83 The Final Rule seeks to further these objectives by 
providing guidance on how to maintain a transaction monitoring 
program and a watch list filtering program that prevents transactions 
with these sanctioned entities, groups, or individuals.84 
The watch list filtering program must meet five minimum 
attributes, to the extent applicable.85  It must: 
 
(1) be based on the Risk Assessment of the institution; 
(2) be based on technology, processes or tools for 
matching names and accounts, in each case based on the 
institution’s particular risks, transaction and product 
profiles; (3) include end-to-end, pre- and post- 
implementation testing of the Filtering Program, 
including, as relevant, a review of data matching, an 
evaluation of whether the OFAC sanctions list and 
threshold settings map to the risks of the institution, the 
logic of matching technology or tools, model validation, 
and data input and Program output; (4) be subject to on- 
going analysis to assess the logic and performance of the 
technology or tools for matching names and accounts, as 
well  as  the  OFAC  sanctions  list  and  the  threshold 
 
81. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BANK SECRECY ACT, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING, AND 
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/ 
virtual/bsa.pdf. 
82. See Office of Foreign Assets Control – Sanctions Programs and Information, U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (containing information on the sanctions lists and allowing users 
to simultaneously search all the lists). 
83. Id. 
84. See NYDFS Regulation § 504.3(b) (requiring that programs be “reasonably 
designed for the purpose of interdicting transactions that are prohibited by OFAC”). 
85. Id. 
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settings to see if they continue to map to the risks of the 
institution; and (5) documentation that articulates the 
intent and design of the Filtering Program tools, 
processes, or technology.86 
 
In addition to the specific requirements of each program, both 
the transaction monitoring and watch list filtering programs must 
require, to the extent applicable: 
 
(1) identification of all the data sources that contain 
relevant data; (2) validation of the integrity, accuracy 
and quality of data to ensure that accurate and complete 
data flows through the Transaction Monitoring and 
Filtering Program; (3) data extraction and loading 
processes to ensure a complete and accurate transfer of 
data from its source to automated monitoring and 
filtering systems, if automated systems are used; (4) 
governance and management oversight, including 
policies and procedures governing changes to the 
Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program to ensure 
that changes are defined, managed, controlled, reported, 
and audited; (5) vendor selection process if a third party 
vendor is used to acquire, install, implement, or test the 
Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program or any 
aspect of it; (6) funding to design, implement and 
maintain a Transaction Monitoring and Filtering 
Program that complies with the requirements of  this 
Part; (7) qualified personnel or outside consultant(s) 
responsible for the design, planning, implementation, 
operation, testing, validation, and on-going analysis, of 
the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program, 
including automated systems if applicable, as well as 
case management, review and design making with 
respect to generated alerts and potential filings; and (8) 
periodic training of all stakeholders with respect to the 
 
 
 
86. Id. 
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Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program.87 
 
Together, the transaction monitoring and filtering programs are intended 
to prevent or interdict illegal or suspect transactions.88 
The third requirement, the annual certification, requires that 
regulated financial institutions complete an Annual Board Resolution or 
Senior Officer(s) Compliance Finding, due by April fifteenth of each 
year to the Superintendent of the New York Department of Financial 
Services, stating that the bank is complying with  the  regulation.89  
Under the proposed rule, this requirement was controversial because the 
filing of an incorrect or false certification statement could have resulted 
in criminal penalties for the “Certifying Senior Officer” of the bank.90   
In the Final Rule, the Department of Financial Services removed the 
possibility of criminal penalties against the filing officer.91 Instead, the 
“regulation will be enforced pursuant to, and is not intended to limit, the 
Superintendent’s authority under any applicable laws,” meaning the 
Superintendent can take any measures allowable under currently  
existing laws to enforce the regulation.92 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK REGULATION 
 
Adopting regulations to combat money laundering by state- 
chartered banks strengthens the existing regulatory structure enacted to 
prevent the financing of terrorism.93 The federal government has 
traditionally regulated financial institutions in regards to AML 
measures.94     Federal  regulations  apply   to  all  financial  institutions, 
 
87.    Id. § 504.3(c). 
88.    See id. § 504.1 (describing the ultimate goals of the increased regulations). 
89.    Id. § 504.4. 
90. Banking Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements and 
Certifications (“Proposed NYDFS Regulation) § 504.5 (proposed Dec. 1, 2015), http:// 
www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/proposed/rp504t.pdf (“A Certifying Senior Officer who 
files an incorrect or false Annual Certification also may be subject to criminal penalties for 
such filing.”). 
91. See NYDFS Regulation § 504.5 (“This regulation will be enforced pursuant to, and 
is not intended to limit, the Superintendent’s authority under any applicable laws.”). 
92. Id. 
93. MICHAEL T. GERSHBERG, STEVEN M. WITZEL & JUSTIN A. SCHENCK, FRIED, FRANK, 
HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON, LLP, NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
PROPOSED RULE TO INCREASE AML AND SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS (Mar. 28, 
2016), http://documents.lexology.com/86410726-7cb6-4de1-9ad9-dc1c19e5db24.pdf. 
94. See BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 1–48 (describing the federal BSA/AML 
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regardless of whether their charter comes from the federal government, 
state government, or a foreign government.95 Although state banks and 
other nonbank financial institutions are typically smaller in asset size 
and can more easily monitor transactions and detect suspicious activity, 
their vulnerability to money laundering remains high.96 The Final Rule  
is intended to fill the gaps left in the regulatory scheme that allow this 
vulnerability.97 It was not enacted without analysis, commentary, and 
criticism, however.98 Additionally, the Final Rule presents many 
challenges for regulated institutions and could result in unintended 
consequences for the state of New York.99 
 
A. Critique of the New York Regulation 
 
Prior to adoption, many experts, including banking groups such 
as the American Bankers Association, felt the proposed regulation did 
not align with present  federal  regulations.100  These  experts  believed 
that the proposed regulation would not hinder terrorist efforts to move 
money through the financial system because the regulation will often be 
inconsistent with federal regulations.101 In the opinion of the New York 
Bankers Association, “the proposal w[ould] layer duplicative and 
sometimes inconsistent requirements over an already comprehensive set 
of federal rules.”102 
 
regulatory structure). 
95. Suzanne Barlyn, Bank Groups Pan Proposed New York Rules to Prevent Illicit 
Financing, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/new-york- 
moneylaundering-rules-idUSL2N17417D. 
96. See FATF, EMERGING TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 21  (“The 
sheer size and scope of the international financial sector gives terrorist groups and financiers 
the opportunity to blend in with normal financial activity to avoid attracting attention.”). 
97. See NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30 (“It is time 
to close the compliance gaps in our financial regulatory framework to shut down money 
laundering operations and eliminate potential channels that can be exploited by global 
terrorist networks and other criminal enterprises.”). 
98. See Barlyn, supra note 95 (discussing the criticism that various banking groups 
gave about the proposed rule). 
99. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72 (discussing “strategic alternatives” banks can act 
upon to avoid compliance with the final rule). 
100. Barlyn, supra note 95. 
101. Barlyn, supra note 95. 
102. Barlyn, supra note 95. The American Bankers Association also felt that the 
proposed rule would create inconsistent regulations and lead to a decrease in effectiveness  
of the Regulations. Barlyn, supra note 95. To view the comment  submitted  by  the 
President  and  CEO  of  the  American  Bankers  Association,  go  to  http://www.aba.com/ 
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The New York Department of Financial Services, as a result, 
adjusted the Final Rule to reflect many of these objections.103 Most 
notably, the criminal liability provision for compliance officers was 
removed from the regulation, although under existing law bank officials 
may still be criminally liable as a result of submitting false reports.104 
An interesting consideration in regards to this regulation is whether 
criminal penalties will still be pursued for violations of this 
regulation.105 While the Final Rule does not specifically call for  
criminal liability as the proposed rule did, New York state law still 
allows for criminal liability, inter alia, for offering a false instrument for 
filing and failing to maintain accurate books and records.106 There is no 
doubt that the Department of Financial Services possesses the ability to 
bring criminal charges, but whether they will exercise that ability to 
enforce the regulation remains to be seen.107  Regardless, these state  
laws are important tools that the New York Department of Financial 
Services can utilize if abuse of the regulation occurs.108 
 
B. Challenges in Implementing the New York Regulation 
 
The Final Rule presents numerous challenges for covered 
institutions, but the legislation is an essential step towards  offering 
better protection to New York financial institutions and the greater 
financial system from money laundering.109 This in turn can have a 
positive effect on reducing terrorist financing.110   One challenge that 
 
Advocacy/commentletters/Documents/cl-NYDFS-TransactionMonitoring2016.pdf. 
103. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 1–2. 
104. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, CLIENT MEMORANDUM: NYDFS ISSUES FINAL 
RULE ON TRANSACTION MONITORING AND FILTERING PROGRAMS FOR REGULATED 
INSTITUTIONS 5 (July 22, 2016) [hereinafter DAVIS POLK], https://www.davispolk.com/sites/ 
default/files/NYDFS.Final_.Transaction.Monitoring.7.22.16.pdf. 
105. See id. (“It is still possible to be criminally liable for violations of the Final Rule 
under existing New York banking and penal laws . . . .”). 
106. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 175.10 (McKinney  2016) (Falsifying Business  Records), 
175.35 (Offering False Instrument for Filing); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 672.1  (McKinney 
2016) (Falsification of Books and Reports). 
107. DAVIS POLK, supra note 104, at 5. 
108. See DAVIS POLK, supra note 104, at 5 (stating that it is “still possible to be 
criminally liable for violations of the Final Rule under existing New York banking and  
penal laws”). 
109. See KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4–5 (describing the difficulties that covered 
institutions will face in implementing the regulations). 
110. Barlyn, supra note 95. 
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covered institutions will face is the short time frame available for 
implementation.111 The Final Rule became effective  on  January  1, 
2017, and the first compliance finding is due April 15, 2018, so 
institutions must act quickly to implement the transaction monitoring 
and watch list filtering programs.112 While some  institutions, 
particularly larger ones, already have similar programs in place, they 
will surely have to go further in their efforts.113  Based on the findings  
by the Department of Financial Services prior to proposing this 
regulation, these programs were inadequate and ineffective in 
preventing these transactions from taking place.114 With the 
implementation of these programs, particularly in institutions that do  
not already have them in place, comes a large cost.115 To implement 
these programs, institutions will be forced to run risk assessments and 
determine whether or not their present programs comply with the 
regulation.116 If the institution determines that their systems are not 
sufficient then they will have to spend additional money implementing 
these programs prior to the first compliance finding due date.117 
Another hurdle that covered institutions will have to contend 
with is the ambiguous language of the Final Rule.118   The Final Rule 
 
111. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4. 
112. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 2. In May of 2016, the Department of the Treasury’s 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) passed legislation that expanded 
requirements for customer due diligence, which covered institutions will have to implement 
in addition to the Final Rule. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial 
Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 29398 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010,  
1020, 1023, 1024, and 1026); SATISH M. KINI ET AL., DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, CLIENT 
UPDATE: FINCEN ISSUES NEW RULE REQUIRING IDENTIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERS  
AND RISK-BASED CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE 1 (May 16, 2016), http://www.debevoise.com/ 
~/media/files/insights/publications/2016/05/ 
20160516b_fincen_issues_new_rule_requiring_identification_of_beneficial_owners_and_ri 
sk_based_customers_due_diligence.pdf. 
113. See FRIESEN & FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 4 (“[E]ach regulated institution should 
review and, where necessary, enhance its existing programs to ensure that they are 
reasonably designed and risk-based to meet the NYDFS’ requirements.”). 
114. See Banking Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements 
(“NYDFS Regulation”) § 504.1 (effective Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/ 
regulations/adoptions/dfsp504t.pdf (“As a result of these investigations, the Department 
identified shortcomings in the transaction monitoring and filtering programs of the 
institutions attributable to a lack of robust governance, oversight, and accountability at 
senior levels.”). 
115. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4. 
116. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4. 
117. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4. 
118. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4. 
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contains technical industry language that is not defined in the 
regulation.119 While the requirements are fairly  well  outlined  in  the 
Final Rule, implementation will almost certainly look different at each 
institution and there will not be a “one size fits all” solution.120 
Accordingly, the Department of Financial Services will have to develop 
a strategy for analyzing compliance of such varying degree.121 
 
C. The Unintended Consequences of the New York Regulation 
 
A thought-provoking potential side effect of the regulation is the 
possibility of a decrease in regulated financial institutions that are 
chartered or licensed in New York.122 This regulation has the potential  
to pose significant costs for some institutions, and at the very least 
provides significantly more regulation.123 In addition, there is also the 
possibility of liability for individuals responsible  for  certification.124 
The increased costs and regulations, as well as potential liability may 
drive regulated institutions to consider “strategic alternatives” to avoid 
having to comply with the regulation, which would dictate that the 
institution not be under the supervision of the New York Department of 
Financial Services.125 To accomplish this, New York state-chartered 
banks may choose to convert to a nationally chartered bank or relocate 
to another state and take up charter in its new home state.126 
Additionally,  state-licensed  nonbank  institutions  may   convert   to   a 
 
 
 
119. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4. 
120. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4. 
121. See KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4–5 (“Implementation of these requirements may 
look different at each institution, and it is not clear how the NYDFS will seek to assess 
covered institutions’ efforts to comply . . . .”). 
122. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72 (stating that increased compliance measures may 
lead institutions to seek a different charter or relocate operations to a new geographic area). 
123. KINI, ET AL, supra note 74, at 4 (“For some institutions, the cost of implementing 
the required changes may be high.”). 
124. See DAVIS POLK, supra note 105, at 5 (indicating that criminal liability is still a 
possibility for certifying officers under existing New York banking and penal laws); N.Y. 
Penal Law §§ 175.10 (McKinney 2016) (Falsifying Business Records), 175.35 (Offering 
False Instrument for Filing); N.Y. Banking Law § 672.1 (McKinney 2016) (Falsification of 
Books and Reports). 
125. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72 (providing alternatives to implementing the 
increased regulations, including converting to a national bank charter or relocating 
operations to a new state). 
126. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72. 
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national license.127 It is entirely possible that this well-meaning 
regulation could produce unintended negative consequences for New 
York, including the loss of fee revenue collected from regulated 
institutions.128 This is particularly true if the federal government does  
not adopt a similar regulation nationally, which could result in a 
significant number of state entities switching their charters or licenses to 
their national equivalent.129 
On the other hand, in terms of national policy, New York’s 
increased regulations allow the federal government to observe the  
effects and consequences of these new requirements, and make a 
reasoned decision whether similar legislation is necessary or feasible at 
the federal level.130 The United States’ dual banking system, in which 
states are intended to be laboratories for experimentation, gives the 
federal government the benefit of “testing” legislation or regulations 
before they are adopted on a national level.131 If this regulation is 
successful in limiting or preventing money laundering, and as a result, 
the financing of terrorism, the federal government should pass similar 
and meaningful legislation to increase regulations.132 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
Through the Final Rule, New York is cracking down on 
financial institutions in an effort to prevent money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism.133 The new regulation enhances the security of  
the already existing federal BSA/AML laws and clarify the 
requirements  and expectations for financial institutions.134   Despite the 
 
127. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72. 
128. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72. 
129. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72. 
130. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE DUAL BANKING 
SYSTEM 8 (2003), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other- 
publications-reports/national-banks-and-the-dual-banking-system.pdf (“[T]he varied powers 
and regulatory approaches possible in different states enable state systems to serve as 
laboratories for innovation . . . .”). 
131. Id. at 10. 
132. See id. at 8–9 (describing the functionality of the state banking systems as 
laboratories for innovation and change at the federal level). 
133. See Banking Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements 
(“NYDFS Regulation”) § 504.5 (effective Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/ 
regulations/adoptions/dfsp504t.pdf (“This regulation will be enforced pursuant to, and is not 
intended to limit, the Superintendent’s authority under any applicable laws.”). 
134.    Id. § 504.1. 
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costs and difficulties that covered institutions will face during initial 
implementation, the long-run benefits of the Final Rule will outweigh 
the short-term drawbacks.135 Financial institutions, particularly large 
institutions, conduct such a high volume of transactions on a daily basis 
that without effective monitoring programs, suspect transactions can  
slip through the cracks.136 New York has taken existing regulations and 
expanded them to further protect the financial system through its 
regulated institutions, including state-chartered banks.137 
It is now incumbent on the federal government to follow the 
example set by the state of New York and increase regulation for 
nationally chartered banks.138 High profile enforcement actions against 
institutions such as JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup in recent years have 
suggested that the current BSA/AML regulations are not stringent 
enough to adequately protect our financial system from the 
consequential vices that necessitate enforcement actions.139 The 
unintended consequences of this regulation that may result, namely the 
state to federal charter flip, highlight the necessity of Congress adopting 
a similar regulation at the federal level.140 If this regulation were passed 
on a national level, it would circumscribe any attempt for an institution 
to avoid compliance by seeking a national charter or license.141 
Although nationally chartered banks are already subject to a 
substantial amount of regulation, they house a significant portion of the 
nation’s assets and play an integral role in the global economy.142   If 
 
135. See id. (seeking to clarify the requirements for financial institutions to reduce 
shortcomings and improve the systems for greater effectiveness). 
136. See FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 21 (“[T]errorism 
financing through the banking sector is often small-scale and can be difficult to distinguish 
from the large number of legitimate financial transactions undertaken each day.”). 
137. See NYDFS Regulation § 504.1 (clarifying transaction monitoring and watch list 
filtering program requirements and adding an annual certification requirement). 
138. See NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30 (describing 
the increased regulations that will close gaps in the current regulatory scheme). 
139. See generally Jill Schlesinger, JPMorgan Chase: Bank Faces Major Regulatory 
Action, CBS: MONEYWATCH (Jan. 11, 2013, 8:03 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
jpmorgan-chase-bank-faces-major-regulatory-action/ (describing the enforcement action JP 
Morgan Chase faced in relation to it’s AML and compliance programs and noting other 
major AML enforcement actions). 
140. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72 (describing steps that covered institutions can take 
to avoid compliance with the regulations, including adopting a national charter). 
141. ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72. 
142. See Large Commercial Banks, Federal Reserve Statistical Release, FED. RESERVE 
BD., https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current/ (updated June 30, 2016) (ranking 
the largest commercial banks in the United States by consolidated assets and indicating what 
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efforts to hinder exploitation of the financial system to aid money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism are to be successful, 
regulations must be stricter in these areas.143 The federal government 
must work in conjunction with states, such as New York, to ensure that 
its regulations are sufficient and do not provide conflicting requirements 
that place an ever-growing demand on financial institutions.144 If the 
existing regulatory structure stays intact as is, an infinite number of 
transactions will remain undiscovered, as they do today, and the 
prevalence of terrorism will not decrease.145 This regulation has effects 
that reach beyond the state of New York, and money laundering does 
not happen there exclusively.146 For this or similar regulations to be 
effective, their mandates must be implemented across all state and 
federal jurisdictions.147 
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charter the bank holds). 
143. See NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30 (“It is time 
to close the compliance gaps in our financial regulatory framework to shut down money 
laundering operations and eliminate potential channels that can be exploited by global 
terrorist networks and other criminal enterprises.”). 
144. NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30. 
145. NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30. 
146. See, e.g., KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4 (highlighting the global reach and 
effects of terrorism). 
147. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 130, at 8–9 (describing the state 
banking system as laboratories for change at the national level). 
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